Chapter 13
Chapter 14
Submission Instructions:
Completeyour assignment by clicking Write Submission (not Comments) by enteringtext into the textbox and format using the Blackboard formatting tools–OR–use the paste function and copy from a word processor document into the textbox(recommended) and click Submit.You may view your posting both on this page and under My Grade (available under Tools). Do not attach files. For each question include at least one linkto an internet site you researched to form your answer to that question.
Extra Credit Work. This assignment gives you the opportunity to earn extra credit points which will be totaled separately from the required assignments. Submit it in a BB message using as the subject line the words Extra Credit and the chapter number. An extra credit assignment must be submitted in the same timeframe as the required assignment.
Chapter 13 Extra Credit: NCJRS
Go to the Justice Information Center website at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ Click on Juvenile Justice. You may have better luckgoing right to Juvenile Justice at https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Topics/Topic.aspx?Topicid=122.Then choose one of the documents listed.
Read the document and write a summary of it which contains the salient points of the research. Ensure that your summary includes sufficient detail that your instructor can judge your understanding of the document. Note that there are more related links if none of the documents immediately listed catch your interest.
Provide a link to the document you summarized
Chapter 14: Less-Than-Lethal Weapons
Research the issue of non-lethal weapons suitable for deployment by law enforcement agencies. Discuss this topic in detail in order to demonstrate an understanding of their deployment. List three types of non-lethal weapons still in the experimental stage or which have been recently been adopted.
Discuss their operational characteristics methods of deployment effect on the intended target (and risks to non-intended citizens) the duration of the effects etc. Of the three which do you feel will be most likely to be utilized in the near future? Why? Which one is least likely to be adopted? Why? What benefit will this new technology provide to the police department and the community?
Provide links to at least three internet sites you researched.
Day: April 17, 2018
– Please read Chapter 1 of the class text
G4S. (2011). London 2012 olympic games. G4S International 1(11). Retrieved from
http://www.g4s.com/en/Media%20Centre/International%20magazine/International%202011%201/~/media/Files/International%20magazine/2011%20Issue%201/International%20Magazine%20Issue%201%202011.ashx
There are three sections required for this week’s assignment. Section #1 – Your first assignment is to discuss all the factors that contributed to the growth of the private security industry especially the commercial sector. Be specific and use examples to support your answer. You will also be required to discuss and predict what you believe the impetus will be for the growth of private security the next 10 years. Section #2 – Your second assignment requires you to conduct an internet search to locate a successful contract security company in your region or your hometown. Give at least four reasons for the secret to their success. If you were going to start your own contract security company what would your mission and company values be? Your answer should be detailed and specific. Section #3 – Skim the magazine of one of the largest security companies in the world – G4S Securicor (found in the course resources section under week 1) and list the three most interesting things from the magazine that you believe help contribute to the company’s success. Place all the assignments into one Word Document. The student will ensure all syllabus requirements are met. (Minimum word count is 800).
Edit
CRIME VICTIMS
CRIME VICTIMS
By KARMEN
REQUIRED
EDITION: 9TH 16
PUBLISHER: CENGAGE L
ISBN: 9781305261037. Due date: March 14 at 11:50PM
The length of this assignment should no more than seven pages including a bibliography page
1. What kinds of information about victims of interpersonal violence and theft can be found in the FBI’s annual Uniformed Crime Report? What are the sources of inaccuracies in these statistics?
2. Make a list of seven of the most dangerous countries and/or cities in the world based in the murder rates
3. Compare and contrast victim facilitation victim precipitation and victim provocation. make up scenarios to illustrate the difference
4. Describe the process of victim blaming step by step and then argue that people whose identities were stolen may have made the thieves’ tasks easier. How can they avoid victimization
5. Describe the victim-defending point of view and then apply it to motor vehicle theft
6. Is it possible to be to crime conscious–to concerned about being victimized? Defend your point of view by providing examples of risk reduction strategies that demand sacrifices that might be considered by some prudent but by other to be unreasonable
7. If victims are unable to participate because of their very serious wounds or are too young to make such important decisions who if anyone should exercise their rights in their names? Provide an example
8. Why were the views of maximalists and minimalists so far apart on the fate of missing children?
9. Give the possible reasons why the number of murders of spouses has dropped so sharply over recent decades while the slaying of girlfriends and boyfriends actually has gone up
10. Why do some teenage girls endure courtship violence when they are merely dating and they do not have to rely on they boyfriends for financial support and they are not living together and not rising children together?
SECTION ONE
Homework assignment: Artwork Annotation:
Please annotate one artwork : The Landscape of Signs: Pop Art
OUTLINE:
Identify the artwork
Identify Period Style
Identify Subject Matter:
Discuss Historical Context:
Discuss Visual Elements (Line Color Texture Composition etc.)
Discuss Its Place in Ideas of Time
SECTION TWO
Intellectual Property and Pop Art Keep Answers brief on point relevant and plagiarism FREE
.
Do you think it should be legal for artists to borrow and remix visual material owned by others? In the 1960s Campbell Soup actually encouraged Warhol to make artwork about their product. Apparently they even sent him free soup. 🙂
Things have changed now though. Artists have been sent cease and desist letters for infringing on intellectual property rights. Here is some food for thought:
1) An old art professor of mine tried to copyright a simple black dot. She was trying to make a point that intellectual property law needs to be reformed. Well it worked. She was threatened by a firm that claims to have already copyrighted a black dot. She used to show the letter and other information as an installation work.
2) The idea of a crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich is considered private property in the US. How can this be??
3) Electronic and rap artists have been sued for remixing other artist’s works.
You can go on and on with examples. You likely know some.
Do you think the use of visual logos and imagery for artwork at least should be considered fair use under property law? What do you think?
USING AN ESSAY FORMAT PLEASE READ AND ANSWER THE QUESTIONS BELOW IN COMPLETE DETAIL. FAILURE TO ANSWER ALL PARTS OF EACH QUESTION WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF POSSIBLE POINTS AWARDED. THUS SKIMPY ANSWERS REFLECTING ONLY A FEW SENTENCES WILL BE MARKED AS INCORRECT.
YOU MAY USE YOUR TEXT AND OTHER SCHOLARLY MATERIAL. ANSWERS SHOULD REFLECT A WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF CONCEPTS AND DEMONSTRATION OF CRITICAL THINKING SKILLS NOT A CARBON COPY OF THE TEXTBOOK OR OTHER SOURCES. ALL MATERIAL USED IN COMPLETION MUST BE CITED USING THE APA OR MLA FORMAT.
PLEASE DO NOT RETYPE THE QUESTIONS. SIMPLY NUMBER YOUR RESPONSES TO EACH QUESTION ADDRESSED.
NOTE- COMPLETION OF THIS ASSIGNMENT WILL REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF 3 TYPED PAGES (DOUBLE-SPACED) OF MATERIAL TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS EACH QUESTION.
PLEASEOTE- THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT ESSAY ASSIGNMENT AND MUST BE COMPLETED AS SUCH. SHARING OF ANSWERS IS PROHIBITED. DUPLICATION OF THE ANSWERS WILL RESULT IN FAILURE AND REPORTED TO DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES!
v Define and explain the difference between criminology and criminal justice.
v Criminology is related to the study of deviance. Explain in detail how criminology deviant behaviors and crime overlap.
v Provide a detailed definition of the consensus view of crime the conflict view of crime and the interactionist view of crime. Compare and contrast these three perspectives.
v Explain in detail what ethical issues should criminologists consider when conducting criminological research and why should these issues be considered?
v What are the characteristics of a high-risk lifestyle and how do these characteristics contribute to ones risk of victimization?
v Discuss the four basic concepts in common between routine activities theory and the lifestyle approach and provide three predictions shared by both theories.
v Discuss the origin of rational choice theory and its basic assumptions.
v Some argue that violence is a matter of choice and it is a rational process that serves a purpose. Discuss your thoughts related to this.
v Explain in detail the goals of violence?
Opinion Question:
v Despite efforts to punish criminals and make them fear crime there is little evidence that the fear of apprehension and punishment alone can reduce crime rates. How can this discrepancy be explained?
Note:
Answer the following discussions in 250-300 words EACH. Must support EACH discussion answer with two credible sources cited in APA. Must Address all question properly. Must provide 100% original answer.
DO NOT PROVIDE THE PREVIOUSLY USED WORK.
DO NOT WRITE QUESTIONS IN ANSWER!
Discussion 1: (250-300 words and two credible sources cited in APA)
Comment on the following problem addressing the questions below.
Seller contracts to sell 1000 gizmos to the buyer for $3000. The contract terms are F.O.B. buyers place of business.
a) What kind of contract is this?
b) What kind of shipment does this contract require?
c) When are the goods to be delivered?
d) Where are the goods to be delivered?
e) Who pays the expenses of the freight?
f) When/where is payment due?
Discussion 2: (250-300 words and two credible sources cited in APA)
Post commentary on the importance of having Article 2 UCC gap filler provisions and the importance of allowing parties to have the freedom to contract that the UCC is supposed to foster.
Discussion 3: (250-300 words and two credible sources cited in APA)
Discuss the importance of UCC provisions that protect against bad deals bad faith and excessive prices and remedy meddling.Has anyone ever dealt with this type of seller? Explain.
Discussion 4: (250-300 words and two credible sources cited in APA)
Under the UCC what are the Buyers rights regarding inspection? If the buyer determines the goods are not conforming what are the rights of the buyer? What happens if there is a dispute between the seller and buyer regarding whether the goods conform? Please cite specific UCC language when referring to the UCC.
First Slide
Explain the applicable law(s).
Second Slide
Issue [Note the central question or questions on which the case turns]
Court of Appeal First District Division 4 California.
Barbara J. NEISENDORF Plaintiff and Appellant v. LEVI STRAUSS & CO. et al. Defendants and Respondents.
No.A109826.
Decided: August 29 2006
Schneider & Wallace and Todd M. Schneider Carolyn H. Cottrell and Zachary R. Cincotta San Francisco The Lucas Law Firm and Kathleen M. Lucas San Francisco Law Office of Ted. W. Pelletier and Ted W. Pelletier for Appellant. Littler Mendelson and Margaret Hart Edwards San Francisco Michael Mankes and Paul R. Lynd San Francisco Levi Strauss & Co. and Tracy M. Preston for Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Following 14 weeks of medical leave appellant Barbara Neisendorf’s at-will employment with respondent Levi Strauss & Co. (LS&Co.) was terminated. She filed suit claiming among other things that the termination of her employment violated the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act of 1993 (CFRA) ( Gov.Code 12945.2; Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2 7297 subd. (b)) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.Code 12900 et seq.). After most of Neisendorf’s case was dismissed on summary adjudication including her claims of gender and age discrimination her remaining claims for disability discrimination in violation of the FEHA and retaliation for taking a medical leave under the CFRA proceeded to jury trial. At the conclusion of four weeks of trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of LS&Co. finding by special verdict that Neisendorf was not terminated in retaliation for having taken medical leave under the CFRA and that she was not a disabled person entitled to FEHA’s protection.
While Neisendorf does not challenge the jury’s verdict entered in favor of LS&Co. she appeals two rulings made by the trial court. She first claims the court erred in dismissing her cause of action for violation of the CFRA after the court found that the undisputed facts established that LS&Co. fulfilled all of its affirmative obligations to Neisendorf in conjunction with her CFRA medical leave. She next claims the court erred in ruling that she was not entitled to certain bonus payments from LS&Co. because Neisendorf’s employment with LS&Co. was terminated before she became eligible for any of the bonus payouts. We affirm.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 20 2000 LS&Co. made a written offer of employment to Neisendorf. It offered Neisendorf the position of Vice President Worldwide Training and Development at an annual salary of approximately $250000 a signing bonus of $250000 relocation expenses participation in two incentive bonus plans and a benefits plan. The written offer provided that the employment relationship was at-will and indicated that LS&Co. reserve[d] the right to terminate your employment at any time with or without cause and with or without notice. Neisendorf accepted LS&Co.’s offer of employment on September 26 2000.
During Neisendorf’s two years with LS&Co. both her direct supervisor Fred Paulenich (Paulenich) and her subordinates voiced concerns about her performance. In July 2002 Neisendorf received a written midyear review from Paulenich which pinpointed several concerns. The midyear review noted Neisendorf’s effectiveness-and by extension personal credibility-is greatly hampered by the inability to plan and execute on time on budget against a broadly understood and aligned agenda. Paulenich cited nagging/reoccurring issues with Neisendorf’s personal leadership approach which was described as self-serving upward-serving; not supportive; mistrust; lack of sincerity/genuineness; controlling He concluded with the observation that [t]his is a critical leadership juncture for Neisendorf.
Paulenich met with Neisendorf three different times during July and August 2002 to address the issues raised in this midyear review. Neisendorf refused to acknowledge the criticisms blaming Paulenich and others. Paulenich told Neisendorf that she was not accepting his feedback and that she needed to reflect on what they discussed and begin developing a plan to address the performance issues. At the third meeting Neisendorf declared that they were at an impasse. She offered to resign and requested a separation package worth approximately $1.7 million.
On August 23 2002 shortly after learning that LS&Co. had determined she was not eligible for a separation package Neisendorf took a four-week disability leave based on her physician’s note stating simply that Medically Ms. Neisendorf is unable to work. Neisendorf was ultimately diagnosed as suffering from neurodermatitis irritable bowel and muscle spasm. She later saw a psychiatrist who diagnosed her with a panic disorder. LS&Co. notified Neisendorf of her rights and obligations under the CFRA and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).1 On September 20 2002 Neisendorf’s physician extended her leave by four weeks.
About eight weeks into her leave Neisendorf was medically cleared to return to work if she got needed accommodations. Neisendorf along with her attorney and psychiatrist provided LS&Co. with list of required accommodations for Neisendorf’s return to work. The proposed accommodations included: (1) hiring a neutral external job coach to facilitate the re-establishment of a harmonious and peaceful working relationship between Neisendorf and Paulenich; (2) a job redesign for one to three months during which Neisendorf could have a 40-hour workweek time off to complete treatment and would not be required to execute or witness employee terminations; and (3) a reporting relationship to someone other than Paulenich for a period of three months or more.
LS&Co. responded that it did not believe Neisendorf was legally disabled; nevertheless it was willing to work with her to help her return to work. For the next several weeks LS&Co. and a return-to-work specialist worked with Neisendorf her attorney and her psychiatrist to identify appropriate accommodations acceptable to LS&Co. which would allow her to return to work successfully. However Neisendorf was repeatedly informed that her successful return to her former position was conditioned on her willingness to accept and address the performance deficiencies set forth in the midyear performance review.
On November 25 2002 the return-to-work specialist met with Paulenich and Neisendorf together. After discussing the agreed-upon accommodations Paulenich went over the agenda for the one-on-one meeting with Neisendorf scheduled for the next day including a reminder that they would be discussing performance issues and a development plan. The November 26th meeting lasted two hours during which Paulenich briefed Neisendorf on the status of her projects. Neisendorf and Paulenich agreed that Neisendorf would immediately take over where Paulenich had left off in the department. Paulenich presented Neisendorf with a proposed development plan and explained that she must acknowledge the performance issues that were raised before her leave and agree on a plan for moving forward.
Paulenich’s letter terminating Neisendorf’s employment dated November 26 2002 sets forth what occurred next. It states in relevant part: Unfortunately we were unable to reach any form of agreement on the key development issues that were identified in your 2002 mid-year review. As I indicated your unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of these performance issues and the critical nature they play in the success of yourself and your organization precludes us from having a basis on which we can move forward. Therefore effective today you no longer work at LS&Co.
Following her termination Neisendorf requested a meeting with Philip Marineau LS&Co.’s president and chief executive officer. There Neisendorf refused to accept any responsibility for the performance issues and blamed the problems on Paulenich. She asked to be reinstated without having to report to Paulenich or alternatively separation pay of $1 million. Marineau declined both proposals.
Neisendorf sued LS&Co. on May 23 2003 pleading numerous causes of action including gender discrimination age discrimination disability discrimination wrongful termination and retaliatory discharge. After a series of motions brought by LS&Co. both before and during trial most of Neisendorf’s claims were dismissed. The claims finally submitted to the jury rested on two theories: (1) that LS&Co.’s decision to terminate her employment was motivated by disability discrimination in violation of the FEHA; and (2) that LS&Co.’s decision to terminate her employment was in retaliation for taking medical leave under the CFRA.
By special verdict the jury found the adverse employment action was not taken because of Neisendorf’s exercise of her right to CFRA leave.2 The jury also found Neisendorf was not a disabled person under the FEHA.3 Because Neisendorf was not eligible for FEHA protection LS&Co. had no accommodation obligation to Neisendorf under the FEHA nor could she state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of the public policies embodied in that statute.
As noted Neisendorf has raised no issues in this appeal concerning the jury’s verdict; therefore we are entitled to assume it is correct. She appeals two issues resolved by the trial court as matters of law; namely (1) the court’s dismissal of her claim for violation of the CFRA on the ground that she failed to produce evidence that she was able to perform the essential job functions of her position within the [12-week] CFRA-protected period; and (2) the court’s finding that she was not entitled to any unpaid bonuses from LS&Co.
II.
DISCUSSIONA.Cause of Action under the CFRA
At trial but before submission of the case to the jury the parties stipulated to submit to the [trial] court the second cause of action in Neisendorf’s first amended complaint for violation of the CFRA. The court found Neisendorf had received all of the substantive protections she was entitled to under the CFRA. Consequently the trial court dismissed Neisendorf’s claim of interference with her substantive rights under CFRA and restricted her CFRA claim submitted to the jury to a single claim of retaliatory discharge for taking medical leave under the CFRA.
The CFRA is a portion of FEHA that provides protections to employees needing family leave or medical leave. [Citations.] (Gibbs supra 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 6 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 554; Nelson v. United Technologies (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 597 606 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 239 (Nelson).) The CFRA entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid medical leave during a 12-month period for certain personal or family medical conditions including care for their children parents or spouses or to recover from their own serious health condition.4 (Gov.Code 12945.2; Nelson supra 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 607 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 239.) CFRA’s regulations provide that for an employee to be entitled to a medical leave for her own serious health condition the condition must cause her to be unable to work at all or unable to perform one or more of the essential functions of her position. (Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2 7297 subd. (a)(2)(C).) An employee who takes CFRA leave is guaranteed that taking leave will not result in a loss of job security or in other adverse employment actions. (Gov.Code 12945.2 subd. (l); Cal.Code Regs tit. 2 7297.7 subd. (a).)
After the 12 weeks of CFRA leave expires an employee is entitled to be returned to the same position the employee held when leave commenced or to an equivalent position with equivalent benefits pay and other terms and conditions of employment. (Gov.Code 12945.2 subd. (a); Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2 7297.2 subd. (a).) While an employer’s duties under the FEHA include extending reasonable accommodations to an employee if reasonable accommodations will enable the employee to perform his or her essential duties (Gov.Code 12940 subds.(a)(1) (2)) there is no similar provision in the CFRA requiring an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to an employee returning from CFRA leave.5
In this case there is no dispute that Neisendorf was an eligible employee covered by the CFRA that LS&Co. was an eligible employer and that Neisendorf took a 12-week CFRA medical leave for treatment of a covered medical condition. It is also uncontroverted that upon the expiration of her 12 weeks of CFRA leave Neisendorf had still not returned to work because she was still unable to perform the essential functions of her job without reasonable accommodation. When agreed-upon workplace accommodations were finally put into place several weeks after the 12-week CFRA protected leave period ended Neisendorf returned to work but was terminated the same day.
When the matter was argued below LS&Co. contended that because Neisendorf was not released to return to work without accommodations at the end of her 12 weeks of CFRA leave LS&Co. was no longer under an express statutory duty to reinstate her to her former position or to an equivalent position. The trial court agreed finding: [T]he plaintiff had no basis to proceed under the CFRA because she-when she was ready to return to work it was on condition that certain accommodations be met and that that’s what took the time that brought-that put her beyond the 12 weeks was the discussions regarding accommodations. But under those facts the court felt that there was no claim that was viable or could be pursued by the plaintiff for violation of the [CFRA].
The trial court’s reasoning finds substantial support in cases decided under the FMLA holding that an employer does not violate the FMLA when it fires an employee who is indisputably unable to return to work at the conclusion of the 12-week period of statutory leave. (See Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Center (6th Cir.1998) 155 F.3d 775 784-785 [finding no FMLA violation because the evidence was undisputed that the employee would not have been able to return to work by the statutory deadline]); Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg. Kentucky Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 224 F.3d 840 845 revd. on other grounds 534 U.S. 184 122 S.Ct. 681 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) [concluding that the employee had suffered no harm when she was terminated because she was unable to resume her duties by the end of the FMLA leave period]; Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (N.D.Cal.1997) 980 F.Supp. 1336 1340-1341 revd. on other grounds 164 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir.1999) [employer properly asserts its right to terminate employee when she failed to return to work at the close of the 12-week period].)
On appeal Neisendorf insists the court’s ruling was in error and she should be allowed to pursue her CFRA claim. However Neisendorf has difficulty articulating exactly what type of claim was at issue in the case and persuading us that a jury question was presented on the challenged issue. It is undisputed that LS&Co. accorded Neisendorf the full 12 work-weeks of leave to which she was entitled under the CFRA. To the extent Neisendorf argues that LS&Co. should have reinstated her to her previous position after 12 weeks such an argument ignores the critical fact that Neisendorf was never released to return to work without restrictions. There is no obligation under the CFRA that an employer provide accommodations to an employee in order to allow the employee to return to work within the 12-week period.6
Despite LS&Co.’s correct legal determination that it had no legal duty to accommodate under the FEHA LS&Co. nonetheless worked with Neisendorf and her representatives to reach agreement on appropriate accommodations that would allow her to return successfully to work. After being out on medical leave for 14 weeks the parties stipulated to agreed-upon accommodations and Neisendorf was reinstated to her job at the same level of pay and benefits even though the CFRA did not impose a legal duty to reinstate her to her former position.
While Neisendorf claimed she was terminated in retaliation for asserting her CFRA rights the jury rejected this claim instead returning a verdict indicating she had failed to establish the requisite causal connection between her protected actions in taking a CFRA medical leave and the termination of her employment. (Dudley supra 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 261 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 739.) The evidence at trial revealed that prior to Neisendorf’s departure on CFRA medical leave she had well-documented performance issues which preceded her alleged disability. It is undisputed that LS&Co. had announced its determination to address and resolve these performance issues with Neisendorf before she went on CFRA medical leave but deferred doing so until she returned to work. Her employment was promptly terminated the day she returned to work when it became clear that she still could not commit to working on the unacknowledged performance issues.
Under the regulations implementing the CFRA an employee who requests CFRA leave or is on leave has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment than an employee who remains at work. (See Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2 7297.2 subd. (c)(1).) For this reason even though she took CFRA leave Neisendorf had no greater protection against her employment being terminated for reasons not related to her CFRA request than any other employee at LS&Co.
Neisendorf does not really challenge these points but contends in her reply brief that LS&Co. mischaracterizes her claim under the CFRA. In significantly narrowing her CFRA claim she offers a somewhat unclear argument of what issue under CFRA could possibly be left for a jury’s consideration. To prevent a claim that we too have mischaracterized her CFRA argument we liberally quote Neisendorf’s reply brief. She claims that on this record a jury could find that the Company never intended to return Neisendorf to work. She defines the critical issue as follows: [W]hether an employer can do what the Company did here: agree to engage in the Interactive Process within the 12-week period let that period expire then refuse to allow the employee to return to work.7 Stated another way by Neisendorf: The issue is when the employer engages in the Interactive Process starting during the 12-week CFRA period and extending beyond that period does the CFRA right of reinstatement continue beyond the 12 weeks?
We agree with LS&Co. that Neisendorf cannot proceed with this purported CFRA claim. In attempting to generate some sort of jury question under the CFRA Neisendorf cannot overcome the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for LS&Co.’s decision to terminate her employment. The trial court made extensive findings in its written statement of decision which are not challenged on appeal that Neisendorf was terminated for reasons having nothing to do with taking a CFRA leave or her alleged disability: The evidence at trial also clearly established that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for unsatisfactory performance and gross misconduct. Abundant testimony and documentation were presented showing that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated when she received an unsatisfactory performance evaluation from her immediate supervisor and refused to accept or address the performance deficiencies set forth in the evaluation. [Citations.] This was acknowledged by Plaintiff herself. [Citations.] Thus the termination was directly related to Plaintiff’s performance at LS&Co.
The unchallenged finding that LS&Co. had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to discharge Neisendorf which had nothing to do with her CFRA leave bars Neisendorf from articulating a cognizable cause of action for the jury’s consideration based on LS&Co.’s alleged refusal to honor the CFRA’s right to reinstatement. Several federal courts interpreting the FMLA endorse this principle. (See Arban v. West Pub. Corp. (6th Cir.2003) 345 F.3d 390 401 [An employee lawfully may be dismissed preventing him from exercising his statutory rights to FMLA leave or reinstatement but only if the dismissal would have occurred regardless of the employee’s request for or taking of FMLA leave.]; accord Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp. (8th Cir.2005) 403 F.3d 972 979 [As long as an employer can show a lawful reason i.e. a reason unrelated to an employee’s exercise of FMLA rights for not restoring an employee on FMLA leave to her position the employer will be justified to interfere with an employee’s FMLA leave rights.].) Consequently because LS&Co.’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Neisendorf’s employment eliminated any obligation LS&Co. might have had to reinstate her the court correctly held she could not state a valid claim under the CFRA.
B.Neisendorf’s Entitlement to Bonus Payments
The parties also stipulated that the court could determine Neisendorf’s sixth cause of action claiming entitlement to bonus payments under LS&Co.’s Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) and Leadership Shares Plan. LS&Co.’s AIP is an annual bonus based on both individual and company performance. While there is a target amount established each year for every employee the actual payout could be zero. To be eligible for an AIP bonus where there is a payout an individual must meet the plan’s eligibility requirements which are described in the plan documentation. Payment eligibility is described as follows: Unless termination is due to retirement layoff long-term disability or death a participant must be an active employee of the company on the payment date in order to receive an AIP payment. AIP payments are generally made in February following the close of the fiscal year. (Italics added.) The AIP plan further states: If an employee is involuntarily discharged (e.g. poor performance or misconduct) prior to the AIP payment date that employee will have no right to AIP. (Italics added.)
Eligibility under the Leadership Shares Plan works similarly. The Leadership Shares Plan is a long-term incentive plan that provides for potential payouts to eligible employees for each of years three four and five of the plan if certain company performance goals are met. In some years such as 2002 there was a payout. However in other years such as 2003 and 2004 there was no payout. Leadership Shares are not assigned a value until determination of LS&Co.’s financial performance and approval by LS&Co.’s board of directors in January or February of the following year.
Like the AIP plan the Leadership Shares Plan clearly articulates ineligibility upon termination: If a Participant’s employment is terminated for unsatisfactory performance or for gross misconduct as that term is defined in the Human Resources Procedures manual prior to any Award Payment Date the Participant will not be entitled to receive any Leadership Shares vested or otherwise and no additional payouts will be made. (Italics added.)
After posttrial briefing the court found in favor of LS&Co. ruling that Neisendorf failed to prove that she was eligible to receive any of the bonus payments claimed. The trial court found the undisputed evidence at trial was that both the AIP bonus payout for fiscal year 2002 and the Leadership Shares payout for fiscal year 2002 occurred in February 2003. Plaintiff’s employment with LS&Co. was terminated [for unsatisfactory performance and gross misconduct] on November 26 2002 well before the bonus payout dates. Consequently the court concluded that under the terms of the AIP plan and the Leadership Shares plan Plaintiff was not entitled to a bonus payment. There is no extrinsic evidence offered to interpret the agreement and the facts are undisputed hence we review the trial court’s decision de novo. (Intershop Communications AG v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 191 196 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 847.)
Neisendorf does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that the plans’ terms purport to declare her ineligible. Instead she claims that although the unambiguous terms of the AIP plan and the Leadership Shares Plan require that she be an employee of LS&Co. on the payment date she nevertheless is eligible for the bonuses because LS&Co.’s bonus-plan provisions declaring Neisendorf ineligible to receive the bonuses she had earned violate the Labor Code and are thus void.
As Neisendorf correctly points out bonuses are considered wages within the meaning of Labor Code section 200. (Lucian v. All States Trucking Co. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 972 975 171 Cal.Rptr. 262 (Lucian); Ware v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 35 44 100 Cal.Rptr. 791.) She claims the public policy of this state as expressed in the statutes governing wages obligates LS&Co. to pay her the bonuses despite her manifest ineligibility under the written terms of the bonus plans. Neisendorf contends that the bonus plans’ requirement that she remain employed until an unspecified discretionary future payment date is unenforceable because the public policy inherent in Labor Code section 200 requires certainty in wage provisions. She argues that the bonus payments were part of her bargained-for compensation for services rendered during fiscal year 2002 and the public policy of this state prohibits an employer from forfeiting such compensation when the employee works for the entire period of profits upon which the bonus was based but does not work until an indeterminate date in fiscal year 2003 when the bonus payments are actually made. Essentially Neisendorf contends that forfeiture of the bonus payments in this case was akin to illegal withholding or depriving her of wages that she had earned.
We find nothing in the public policy of this state concerning wages that transforms Neisendorf’s contingent expectation of receiving bonuses into an entitlement. The cited statutes governing wages and prohibiting an employer’s unilateral act to cause a forfeiture of wages are manifestly applicable when wages have been promised as part of the compensation for employment and all conditions agreed to in advance for earning those wages have been satisfied. Likewise once a bonus has been promised as part of the compensation for service and the employee fulfills all the agreed-to conditions the promised bonus is considered wages that must be paid. Consequently defining bonuses as wages protects an employee’s expectation of promised remuneration and prevents the employer from arguing that the promised bonus was an unenforceable gift or gratuity. (See DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 629 635 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 300 (DiGiacinto); Hunter v. Sparling (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 711 723 197 P.2d 807.)
In this case there was no promise made to Neisendorf that she would earn the AIP and Leadership Shares bonuses simply by working for LS&Co. during the fiscal year. LS&Co. expressly tied the payment of an AIP bonus and Leadership Shares bonus to a measurable benchmark. The language of both bonus plans required that she not be terminated for cause before the payout date.8
Neisendorf’s eligibility for bonus payments is properly determined by the bonus plans’ specific terms and general contract principles. California courts have consistently characterized bonus and profit sharing plans as constituting an offer of the stated benefits in exchange for the service of an employee and upon the employee’s completion of the required services in accordance with the terms of the plan a binding contract is formed under which the employer is obligated to deliver the promised benefits. (See DiGiacinto supra 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 635 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 300; Newberger v. Rifkind (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1070 1076-1077 104 Cal.Rptr. 663; Sabatini v. Hensley (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 172 175 326 P.2d 622; Frebank Co. v. White (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 522 525-526 313 P.2d 633; Chinn v. China Nat. Aviation Corp. (1955) 138 Cal.App.2d 98 101 291 P.2d 91.)
A case illustrating these principles is Lucian supra 116 Cal.App.3d 972 171 Cal.Rptr. 262. In Lucian the written employment plans at issue provided for a bonus that would be calculated and paid in full at the end of the calendar year but specified that employees who voluntarily left the company before the bonus calculation date would not be entitled to the bonus. (Id. at pp. 974-975 171 Cal.Rptr. 262.) Three employees who departed voluntarily before the end of the year claimed entitlement to the bonus. As the Lucian court noted a specific bonus plan normally becomes binding as a unilateral contract when the employee begins performance in the sense that the plan then cannot be revoked by the employer. (Id. at p. 976 171 Cal.Rptr. 262.) Each plan at issue had been consistently interpreted and applied to preclude the vesting of any benefits unless the participant completed the current calendar year in the service of his employer. (Id. at p. 975 171 Cal.Rptr. 262.) The Lucian court concluded that summary judgment was properly granted in the employer’s favor because an employee who voluntarily leaves his employment before the bonus calculation date is not entitled to receive it. (Ibid.)
Neisendorf suggests the law is different in a case such as hers which involves an involuntary termination as opposed to the voluntary departure in Lucian. However a case involving involuntary termination was analyzed in Hunter v. Sparling supra 87 Cal.App.2d 711 197 P.2d 807 using the same contractual framework. [T]he offer was to pay a bonus to those still in the employ on December 31 1918. That offer could be accepted only by performing the act requested namely remaining in the employ until that date. The employee was fired before that date so the act required was never performed. The unilateral contract never came into existence. (Id. at p. 724 197 P.2d 807.)
Neisendorf was aware of the terms and conditions of the AIP and Leadership Shares bonus plans and her performance of services for LS&Co. signified acceptance of its terms.9 However the formation of a binding contract which would obligate LS&Co. to deliver Neisendorf the bonus payments would occur only upon Neisendorf’s completion of the required service as specified under the terms of the plans. Since Neisendorf did not perform the required service and she was terminated for cause before the bonus payout date LS&Co. was not obligated to pay her a bonus under the AIP plan and the Leadership Shares Plan for the 2002 fiscal year.10
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to LS&Co.
FOOTNOTES
1.The CFRA and the FMLA (29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.) which is [CRFA’s] federal counterpart provide similar protections to employees needing family or medical leave. (Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255 261 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 739 (Dudley); Gibbs v. American Airlines Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1 6 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 (Gibbs).) Therefore in construing the CFRA California courts sometimes turn to federal decisions construing the FMLA. (See Dudley supra 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 261 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 739.)
2.The jury was asked: Has Plaintiff proved that her taking a CFRA medical leave was a motivating reason for Levi Strauss & Co.’s decision to terminate her employment? The jury responded No.
3.The jury was asked: Has Plaintiff proved that Levi Strauss & Co. knew or thought she had a mental condition disease or disorder that limited her ability to participate in a major life activity? The jury answered No.
4.The employer is generally not required to pay an employee during leave taken pursuant to the CFRA but may require the employee to substitute his or her accrued vacation leave and/or sick leave if the employee takes a leave because of his or her own serious health condition. (Gov.Code 12945.2 subds.(d) (e); Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2 7297.5 subd. (b)(1)(3)(A); Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Verizon California Inc. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 160 163 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 258.)
5.Under the FMLA the CFRA’s federal counterpart once the 12-week period ends an employee who remains unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA (29 C.F.R. 825.214 subd. (b).)
6.Although many arguments made in Neisendorf’s opening brief seem to dispute this legal proposition in her reply brief Neisendorf clarifies her argument and emphasizes that she does not argue that CFRA requires’ accommodations (Italics added.) We note also that when this case was tried below Neisendorf failed to prove an entitlement to protection from termination based on public policies expressed in the FEHA as the jury determined that Neisendorf was not recogn
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Contract Law and Ethics Case Study
Team Case Study
Objectives:
Purpose of Assignment
The purpose of this assignment is to discuss the legally required elements necessary to form a contract the ethical considerations and the remedies for breach.
Assignment Steps
DiscussCase 8.3Vassilkovska v. Woodfield Nissan Inc.with your Learning Team. This case is found inThe Legal and Regulatory Environment of Business pg. 243.
Developa 10-15 powerpoint presentation case study using the following IRAC format: facts issues rule analysis and conclusion.
Analyzewhether Woodfield’s actions in drafting the arbitration agreement were ethical.
Discusswhat remedies Vassilkovska may seek if Woodfield is found to have misrepresented the price of the car as alleged.
Citea minimum of two peer-reviewed references.
Formatyour presentation consistent with APA guidelines.
Your presentation must contain speaker notes on each slide.
You must utiize 3 different media types.
You must present in class for a grade.
Clickthe Assignment Files tab to submit your assignment.
Note:Grades are awarded based upon individual contributions to the Learning Team assignment. Each Learning Team member receives a grade based upon his/her contributions to the team assignment. Not all students may receive the same grade for the team assignment.
Materials
Copyright 2017 by University of Phoenix. All rights reserved.
Part I
Textbook
THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT TODAY 7th edition
BUSINESS IN ITS ETHICS REGULATORY E-COMMERCE AND GLOBAL SETTING
ISBN 9781111530617
Author: Roger LeRoy Miller & Frank B. Cross
These are the questions to be answer from the textbook.
Chapter 10
Questions and case problem beginning on page 305
10-1
10-2
10-5
10-8
Chapter 11
Questions and case problems beginning on page 344
11-1
11-2
11-3
Please find attached pages of the texbook about the questions / case problem. You can also google or chegg as a guide or find the book. Please list references (textbook and other refer
Part 2 – Discussion
1. Is the Statute of Frauds an offensive or a defensive weapon? Additionally what kind of contracts does the Statute of Frauds require to be in writing to be enforceable?
2. If someone breaches a contract what kind of damages can the non-breaching party recover?
3. When a seller under the UCC sells and delivers something to the buyer and the seller does not conform the buyer has 3 options. What are those 3 options?
4. If you worked for a business which resells items in the US (retailer) and were importing your items as they all do and expected these items for the Christmas selling season could this affect you if you were an importer? Could you do anything to protect yourself so that your company could have the needed inventory for the upcoming Christmas selling season? Elaborate.
Global Supply Chains Paralyzed After World’s 7th Largest Container Shipper Files Bankruptcy Assets Frozen
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-08-31/global-supply-chains-paralyzed-after-worlds-7th-largest-container-shipper-files-bank
Assignment 5: Corrections and Victims Rights
Due Week 10 and worth 200 points
Go to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Website and review the Resources For Victims & Witnesses located at http://www.bop.gov/resources/victim_resources.jsp. Next go to the American Correctional Association Website and review the ACA Code of Ethics located at http://www.counseling.org/resources/aca-code-of-ethics.pdf. Lastly go to Cornell University Law Schools Website and review 18 U.S. Code Crime 3771 Crime victims rights located at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3771.
Write a four to six (4-6) page paper in which you:
1) Examine the significant manner in which the Crime Victims’ Rights Act protects the rights of crime victims. Provide your opinion of the effectiveness of this piece of legislation. Justify your response.
2) Determine whether or not victim impact statements add value during sentencing and parole hearings. Provide a rationale for your response.
3) Debate which is more important to a victim: the right to be notified of proceeding or the right to participate in a proceeding. Provide a rationale for your response.
4) Review the following three (3) statements and determine the key ethical responsibilities of corrections personnel associated with them.
5) Recommend two (2) strategies for ensuring that correctional employees (e.g. correctional staff administrators parole officers probation officers etc.) adhere to the ACA Code of Ethics.
6) Debate the importance of victims having a voice in the legal process.
7) Use at least three (3) quality references. Note: Wikipedia and other Websites do not qualify as academic resources.
Your assignment must follow these formatting requirements:
The specific course learning outcomes associated with this assignment are:
