In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the SCOTUS ruled that if a person is detained for a Terry Stop any statute that required him or her to identify himself or herself did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Hiibel came about in 200 when Humboldt County Sheriff’s Office received a call regarding a fight between a man and woman. Hiibel was seen in the area, standing beside a truck with a woman sitting inside of it. The Deputy noticed skid marks behind the vehicle indicating it had come to a sudden stop. The Deputy approached the man and explained why he was searching the area. Deputy then asked for identification from the man who protested. He was eventually arrested and found guilty of “willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office.”5 He appealed it through the Nevada Court System and ended up in D.C. The Court ruled that the “Nevada statute is [narrow] and precise” enough to keep it from being vague and/or ambiguous. That helped it fall squarely within the previously-established guidelines of Terry.
) This case was about a Swat team in Los Angles who raided and house of 73 year old women (Millender) and had them standing outside for 4 hrs. The search came about from a story several days earlier when Jerry Lee Bowen who was Millender foster son shot several shots at his girlfriend who told the police that he may be hiding at his foster mother’s house. Even though the police veteran (Messerschmidt) never asked of any other places Bowen could have who why she believed that he was there? Instead Messerschmidt watched the house for 2 days but never spotted Bowen. On the 3rd day they spoke with both adults of the house which was Mrs. Millender and her 47 year old daughter telling them there was individuals gambling in front of their house but they never mention Bowen nor did they spot him at that time.
Messerschmidt then submitted and affidavit and warrant requesting permission to arrest Bowen and to search Mrs. Millender residence. In his report he gave detailed information regarding the incident with the girlfriend and specific information about Bowen and the weapon he used. He also included that Bowen was affiliated with a local street gang. In his report he felled to mention that they had watched the they had watched the house for 3 days before the search warrant was requested. He felled to mention that during their watch Bowen was never spotted at Mrs. Millender’s home and that it belonged to her.
The basics of this case is that Messerschmidt affidavit sought authorization to search a home where he knowingly has not had the probable cause for the warrant nowhere in the girlfriends statement did it say anything about gang activity or him being a part of a gang that shot at her, but she did state that he lived there with her and not with his previous foster mother. The girlfriend gave specific information about the weapon that was used against her but in Messerschmidt affidavit he sought all of the wrong things. Like establishing identify of the person in control of the premises, all firearms and related items, and evidence showing gang membership. They never found Bowen his shot gun but they seized Mrs. Millenders box of ammunition to a .45 caliber which was legally registered to her. When all was said and done they went back to the girlfriend and asked if she knew where Bowen could be and she said a local motel where he was spotted and arrested. Mrs. Millender filed a violation of her 4th amendment because the warrant was lack of probable cause and she won the case.
2)Minnesota v. Dickerson 508 U.S. 366 1993
In this case and officer was performing a pat down of Mr. Dickerson while stopped in a known drug area. During the “stop and search” the officer felt a lump in Mr. Dickerson’s jacket. The pat down was supposed to be for weapons, but the officer felt confident that the lump was an illegal substance. The officer then reached into Mr. Dickerson’s jacket and discovered that the object was cocain. Being that the search was warrantless and it was only for weapons, the Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was obtained in a manner that went beyond what was acceptable through Terry v. Ohio and would not be admissible in the case.
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Florida V. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248
Suspect Jimeno was stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer who was followng Jimeno overheard what appeared to be a drug transaction, the officer believed that Jmeno was carrying drugs in the car, and asked permission to search Jimeno car. Jimeno consented and the officer found cocaine in a folded bag. Jimeno was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, but the state trial court granted his motion to suppress the cocaine on the ground that hs consent to search the car did not carry with it specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents.
4)One notable Florida case surrounding “consent” to search is Bostick v. State, 554 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 1989). Terrance Bostick was on board a bus scheduled to travel from Miami to Atlanta. Two officers boarded the bus and began questioning occupants relating to drug offenses. Terrance was approached by the officers and provided his ticket and identification which matched. He was then asked permission to search his belongings for narcotics. Bostick allegedly consented to search of his bags which contained a quantity of cocaine. Bostick filed a Motion to Suppress in the trial court alleging a violation of his 4th Amendment rights. The trial court denied and the Defendant entered a plea and was convicted. Bostick appealed to the District Court which affirmed his conviction. He then appealed to the Florida Supreme Court which ruled in his favor. The Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion detailing: “seizure is not limited to physical custody but may be effected by “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” This case is particularly important in Florida because it deals with the voluntariness of an offender’s “consent.”
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